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2ABSTRACT
The framers of the American Constitution devised a singular bicameral legislative body, which
invested substantial power in both a broadly representative lower chamber and a second
“deliberative” chamber that was both insulated from the voters and unrepresentative of the
population as a whole.  Until the early 20th Century, the singular U.S. Congress changed little, but
with growing national responsibilities, it sought to construct organizational forms that could
address a consistently stronger executive.  Since the 1980s, the Congress has relied increasingly
on stronger parties to organize its activities.  This development, embraced in turn by Democrats
and Republicans, has led to changes that have edged the Congress in the direction of parliamentary
democracies.  We conclude this analysis has real, but limited utility, as congressional party leaders
continue to barter for votes and, in the context, of narrow chamber majorities, often rely heavily
on presidential assistance on divisive issues that are important to their party brand. Yet, the
traditional features of the American separated system - bicameralism, the committee systems, and
the centrifugal forces emanating from diverse congressional districts, increasingly complex policy
issues, and the fear of electoral retribution – also remain strong, and effectively constrain the
influence of leaders.  ‘Qualified exceptionalism’ thus most aptly describes the contemporary
American Congress, which remains ‘exceptional,’ but less than unique, as it responds to many of
the same forces, in some of the same ways (e.g., strong parties), as do many other representative
assemblies around the world.
3To some degree, all democratic legislatures are sui generis in that they are the products of the
unique history and culture of the states that host them. In comparative legislative research theory,
the United States Congress is typically portrayed as distinctive, given its status as a significant
and autonomous decision-making institution within a singular governmental system. America is
neither a parliamentary nor a presidential system.  Rather, it operates as a ‘separated system’1 - a
‘government of separated institutions sharing powers’ in Neustadt’s famous phrase,2 whose
origins and dynamics lie in the nature of American society, its political culture, and its
‘exceptional’ historical experience. 3 This separated system is defined by institutional competition
among and between the branches of the federal government, as well as between the national
government and the states, and among various other institutions within specific branches of
government not mentioned in the Constitution. Rockman and Weaver are thus correct in their
conclusion that comparing the American system with all other (parliamentary) systems ‘is less a
matter of comparing apples and oranges than of comparing apples with all other fruits’.4
Understanding the US Congress in Comparative Perspective
The days when political scientists made only constitutional or stylised comparisons between
political systems have long passed. Our focus now rests on second, third and fourth tier
explanations that examine how politicians act purposively within different institutional and
constitutional configurations to effect change and how institutions and processes constrain them.
So, in order to evaluate how decision-making patterns vary across different systems and to assess
the policy capabilities of a particular system, we need to move analysis beyond the architecture of
institutions within formal regime types (presidential, separated or parliamentary) to explore a
much broader array of institutional arrangements and social environments.  These include
secondary institutional characteristics, prevailing political conditions, policymakers’ goals, socio-
economic and democratic conditions, and past policy choices.5  Tsebelis has moved this line of
                                                 
1 Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in A Separated System (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
2 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960, p. 42.
3 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. Vols. I and II. Ed. J.P. Mayer. New York: Harper 1988; Louis Hartz,
The Liberal Tradition in America. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955; Seymour Martin Lipset, American
Exceptionalism. A Double-Edged Sword. New York and London: W.W. Norton), 1997, pp. 42ff; Byron E. Shafer, ed.,
Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); cf. Graham K.
Wilson, Only in America? The Politics of the United States in Comparative Perspective. Chatham, NY: Chatham
House Publishers, 1998, pp. 104-106.
4 R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, ‘Assessing the Effects of Institutions’. In R. Kent Weaver and Bert A.
Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Washington, DC.:
The Brookings Institution, 1993, p. 19.
5 Weaver and Rockman, ‘Assessing the Effects of Institutions’, pp. 10-11.
4argument further by emphasizing the importance in comparative legislative analysis of
determining the pervasive qualitative effects of institutional, partisan and collective veto players,
who must all agree if the policy status quo is to change. Every political system, Tsebelis insists,
has a configuration of veto players with specific ideological distances among them, and a certain
amount of cohesion within each player. These configurations also place veto players in particular
sequences, so that certain veto players have significant power over setting policy agendas. 6
When applied to the United States, Tsebelis’ schema confirms the conventional wisdom of a
system with multiple veto points.  Even more useful for present purposes, however, is the
schema’s capacity to identify similarities between systems that do not rest exclusively on formal
institutions.
A second comparative perspective shows that a political system’s distinctive qualities –
constitutional, political, informal  - do not remain fixed over time, even for relatively short
periods, because politics within democratic systems is dynamic. Interactions between
policymakers and governmental institutions change not only in response to their leaders, but also
to what Woodrow Wilson called ‘the voices in the air which cannot be misunderstood’7 – those
long- and short-term political, economic and social changes in the host society that transform the
nature of problems facing ordinary citizens, and thus the public policies proposed by
policymakers.  For example, following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, power
shifted visibly towards the executive in both the British executive-dominated party government
system and the American separated system. Likewise, when President George W. Bush
experienced political setbacks in the Congress in November 2005, the British Labour
Government – with a numerical majority of 66 seats – experienced its first defeat in eight years
on a three-line whip in the House of Commons, as 63 Labour MPs (one quarter of all
backbenchers) deserted their party. In the longer term, of course, Wilson’s ‘voices’ may compel
structural changes in institutions, party systems, and the conduct of democratic politics without
any changes to the constitution.
Finally, as the world grows more and more interdependent, and economies in democratic
societies converge, politicians increasingly recognise that they share common societal problems,
whether with health, the environment, national identity, new technology, aging populations,
                                                 
6 George Tsebelis, Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ and London: Princeton University
Press, 2003; George Tsebelis, ‘Decisionmaking in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarianism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism’, British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995): 289-325.
7 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1981. Originally
published 1885), p. 54.
5migration, security and terrorism, or myriad other issues.8 In turn, these issues generate new and
complex political questions about the proper role of government and the authoritative allocation
of societal resources. The commonality of these problems and contexts begs a third comparative
legislative research question - do these common problems produce similar cross-system effects
and trends? These might include the universal presidentialisation of executives (with further
consequences for the status and autonomy of legislatures), weakening electoral partisanship,
declining parties and fluid electoral coalitions, the permanent election campaign, the ascendancy
of ‘message’ and media politics, and heightened interest group activity.
In this article, we examine, from both an historical and comparative perspective, the claim that
the US Congress is unique. We begin with an exploration of how constitutional imperatives
structure congressional politics. The discussion then turns to the electoral connection between
Congress members and voters, the congressional lawmaking process, and the nature of legislative
organisation in the Congress.  We draw direct links between the nature of the electoral connection
and congressional representation and lawmaking through members’ personal offices, committees,
and parties. In the third section, we explore the committee-based ‘textbook’ Congress of the
middle decades of the twentieth century, which remains a popular interpretation of congressional
politics, and then explain the contours of the highly partisan contemporary institution. Finally, we
evaluate the Congress’ current manifestation in comparative perspective.
Constitutional Imperatives and Change
The framers of the American Constitution in 1787 were guided by three principal predispositions
that continue to dominate considerations of republican government in the US today. First, unlike
the British parliament of the late 1700s, the new Congress had to be representative in a
meaningful sense, especially of local constituents. Second, given their experience with British
imperialism and preferences for limited government, governmental power could not be
concentrated in a powerful executive.  Third, institutions would need to exercise balance in
responding to the needs and demands of constituents while remaining sufficiently insulated from
the worst excesses of ‘the spirit of locality’ (Madison) and ‘elective despotism’ (Jefferson), which
had often characterised representative government in the individual states.
                                                 
8 See, for example, Wilson, Only in America?
6These guiding principles led to a separated system, in which the House and Senate, as well as the
president, would be elected at different times, by different constituencies, and serve for fixed
terms. A second element required that the House, the Senate, and the president would participate
with, compete against, and check one another in making national policy. According to Madison’s
famous dictum, ‘Ambition must be made to counteract ambition ... to control the abuses of
government’.9   Although Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution does give the Congress
extraordinary powers, neither chamber is assigned unilateral legislative power.  Nor does the
Congress as a whole possess such pre-emptive power, in that its actions remain subject to a
presidential veto, which in turn may be overturned by supermajorities in both chambers (Section
7).  The Constitution does provide solid legislative constraints on the president’s powers, but the
Congress cannot dismiss the executive, save by impeachment for ‘high crimes and
misdemeanours’.  Conversely, the executive cannot call elections that dissolve the Congress.
Other constitutional provisions constructed various ingenious mechanisms that require the
participation of one branch of government in the affairs of others, thus providing for mutual
checks upon the respective institutions.
Institutional competition is rooted in the separated powers, different electoral bases and periods of
office, staggered elections and the Constitution’s multiple ambiguities. This competition
constitutes the American system’s defining feature and separates the Congress from other
legislatures, which are mostly deferential or subordinate to the executive branch. The Congress’
autonomous lawmaking, spending, and oversight powers, along with the differentiated powers
and responsibilities of the House and Senate, mean that the different institutions and chambers
will usually develop different political perspectives and policy agendas.  As anticipated by the
Constitution’s framers, any attempt by the legislature or the executive to act unilaterally, or to
change the balance among institutions, would provoke a powerful reaction from the other branch.
Writing in the wake of 100 years of constitutional experience, Woodrow Wilson noted that the
US Constitution’s great strength lay in ‘its elasticity and adaptability …and thus its ability to
endure and survive.’10  The framers expected that the Congress would initially be the dominant
institution of the national government.  In reality, as Sundquist has aptly observed, ‘the framers
                                                 
9 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York and Toronto: New American
Library, 1961), No.51, p. 322.
10 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1981. (Originally
published 1885), p. 29.
7put two combatants into the ring and sounded the bell that sent them into endless battle.’11 The
expectation of congressional government was rudely disabused in the nineteenth century, first by
‘King’ Andrew Jackson12 and then by Abraham Lincoln for most of the Civil War. Following
Lincoln’s assassination, however, Congress’ radical Republicans ruled much like a British
Cabinet from Capitol Hill and dominated the post-bellum Reconstruction period. In common with
democratic political systems elsewhere, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have witnessed
steady augmentations in executive power, particularly in moments of national crisis, most notably
during the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt (1933-45), Lyndon Johnson (1963-69), Richard
Nixon  (1969-74), and George W. Bush (2001-  ).  But to underline Sundquist’s point, this period
has also witnessed a continual seesawing in the pre-eminence and power of the two branches.
Apart from these presidencies, and to a lesser extent those of Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1908),
Woodrow Wilson (1913-20), and Ronald Reagan in his first year (1981), the remaining years
should properly be characterised either as periods of congressional dominance or of balance
between the two institutions. 13 In this vein, Jones’ analysis of the legislative histories of twenty-
eight important enactments over the post-Second World War period reveals that presidential
preponderance was atypical. Rather, different patterns of institutional interaction emerged, with
lawmaking through balanced participation the most common, regardless of which party (or
parties) controlled the different institutions.14
The same societal forces that produced fluctuations over time in congressional-presidential
relations also generated important variations in the internal organisation of the Congress. The
Constitution makes no provision for how the national legislature should be organised -- except
that the presiding officer of the House of Representatives (the Speaker) should be elected and that
the Vice President (and in his absence, the president pro tempore) should preside over the Senate.
Nor is there any mention of political parties or congressional committees.  The Congress has thus
enjoyed almost complete freedom to develop its own organisational framework, internal rules and
                                                 
11 James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981),
p. 16.
12 Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, pp. 23-29.
13 Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The President, Congress and Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946);
Ronald C. Moe, and Steven C. Teel. ‘Congress As Policymaker: A Necessary Reappraisal’, Political Science
Quarterly, 85 (1970), pp. 443-470; Mark A. Peterson, Legislating Together. The White House and Capitol Hill From
Eisenhower to Reagan (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1990); Nelson W. Polsby, “Some
Landmarks in Modern Presidential-Congressional Relations’, in Anthony King, ed., Both Ends of the Avenue. The
Presidency, the Executive Branch, and the Congress in the 1980s. Washington, DC and London: American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983), pp. 1-25.
14 Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System. Washington, DC. The Brookings Institution Press, 1994,
pp. 19-23, 270-273, 291.
8behavioural norms – and to make changes over time. In the period immediately after the founding
of the American Republic, the legislative branch was substantially inchoate and for its first
seventy-five years it was composed of amateur, transient and poorly educated politicians. As the
House and Senate memberships increased with the growth of population and addition of new
states, and the length of congressional careers rose sharply after the mid-nineteenth century, both
institutions developed increasingly elaborate forms of internal organisation, which have
continued to evolve since that time.15
The Constitution’s framers insisted on a representative assembly, and specifically the
representation of local people, although until the twentieth Century ’the people’ excluded most
women, Native Americans and most southern blacks. The “Continental Congress” – three
successive assemblies in place from 1774 through 1789  – and then the new Congress established
by the constitution of 1787 (and sitting as of 1789) would be composed of representatives who
accepted that they were agents of the local citizens who elected them.16 This insistence on local
representation emphasized the need to reflect the geographical diversity of the United States. The
local perspective was underpinned by (1) the constitutional requirement that House members and
senators must be residents of the state (though not natives) from which they seek election; (2)
simple plurality voting; (3) popular election for two-year terms in the House; (4) single-member
constituencies. These currently comprise about 670,000 people each and, when combined with
candidate selection through primary elections, deny national party leaders strong control over
candidate nominations. Even in the early nineteenth century, when the Congress was an
undeveloped institution populated by transient, part-time amateurs who did not see themselves as
career politicians,17 their individual electoral connections with constituents were paramount.
Constituents could hold legislators individually accountable for their actions in Washington. By
the 1840s, for example, between 20 and 30 percent of incumbents failed to win re-election.18
                                                 
15 Michael Foley and John E. Owens, Congress and the Presidency. Institutional Politics in a Separated System.
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), chapter 1.
16 See James Madison in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New York and
Toronto: New American Library, 1961), No.52, p. 324; and John Adams quoted in Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the
People. The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America. (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1988), p.
241.
17 Nelson W. Polsby, ‘The Institutionalization of the US House of Representatives’, American Political Science
Review, 62 (1968), pp. 144-168; H. Douglas Price, ‘Congress and the Evolution of Legislative “Professionalism”’ in
Norman J. Ornstein, (ed.), Congress in Change (New York: Praeger, 1975). Generally, see Foley and Owens, Congress
and the Presidency, chapter 3.
18 William T. Bianco, David B. Spence, and John D. Wilkinson, ‘The Electoral Connection in the Early Congress: The
case of the Compensation Act of 1816’, American Journal of Political Science, 40/1 (1996), pp. 145-171. See also
Jamie L. Carson, Jeffrey L. Jenkins, David W. Rohde, and Mark A. Souva, ‘The Impact of National Tides and District-
level Effects on Electoral Outcomes: The Congressional Elections of 1862-63’, American Journal of Political Science,
9In the early twentieth century, widespread antipathy towards strong party organisations led to the
reforms of the Progressive era, such as the introduction of the Australian ballot (government-
printed secret ballots that listed all qualifying candidates rather than ballots provided by
candidates, parties and newspapers that listed only favoured candidates) and direct primaries. The
reforms weakened party influence, reinforced the notion that congressional officeholders would
be held accountable to their local constituents at election time, and encouraged House members
and senators to develop highly individualistic electoral connections with their voters, regardless
of party affiliation. Almost all research on the modern Congress accepts David Mayhew’s
stylized assumption that re-election – or fear of retrospective punishment by voters - is either the
sole or primary goal that guides contemporary House members and senators in their legislative
behaviour.19 In consequence, the United States Congress has long been the terrain par excellence
for the individual legislator. 20
Senators and House members win (re) election as individuals, not because of their party
connections. Candidates nominate themselves, offer themselves to a party, often raise large
amounts of money, create their own publicity, and direct their own campaigns. Personal ambition
is a major factor. “Today, you are either a self-starter or a no-starter”, the former US Senator
Thomas Eagleton observed in the early 1980s.21 In other words, Congressional candidates tend to
recruit their parties, not vice versa, and for the very good reason that parties cannot control
nominations or provide candidates with many campaign resources (volunteers, campaign finance,
                                                                                                                                                  
45/4 (2005), pp. 887-898; and Jamie L. Carson and Erik J. Engstrom, ‘Assessing the Electoral Connection: Evidence
from the Early United States’, American Journal of Political Science, 49/4 (2005), pp. 746-757. Other scholars have
argued that deference to social and political elites (Formisano) or support for the incumbent party (Skeen) rather than
electoral accountability were more potent forces while Polsby and Price have argued that since most legislators were
not interested in a legislative career at this time, they lacked incentives to cultivate constituency support. See Ronald P.
Formisano, ‘Deferential-Participant Politics: The Early Republic’s Political Culture’, 1789-1840’, American Political
Science Review, 68 (1974), pp. 484-510; C. Edward Skeen, ‘Vox Populi, Vox Dei: The Compensation Act of 1816 and
the Rise of Popular Politics’, Journal of the Early Republic, 6 (1986), pp. 253-74; Polsby, ‘The Institutionalization of
the US House of Representatives’; Price, ‘Congress and the Evolution of Legislative “Professionalism”’.
19 Mayhew, The Electoral Connection. In more complex models, legislators balance their reelection goals with other
goals, including making good public policy, gaining influence in the Congress, or progressive career ambition. See
Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1973); John W. Kingdon, Congressmen’s
Voting Decisions. Second edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1981.
20 Jonathan N. Katz and Brian R. Sala, ‘Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection’, American
Political Science Review, 90/1 (1996), pp. 21-33; Stephen D. Ansolabehere, James Snyder and Charles Stewart. ‘Old
Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote’, American Journal of Political Science, 44/1, 2000: 17-34; Bruce Cain,
John Ferejohn, and Morris P. Fiorina, The Personal Vote. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press,
1987.
21 Lawrence N. Hansen, ‘The Vanishing American Candidate’, unpublished manuscript, The Joyce Foundation, 1991
quoted in Thomas A. Kazee, ed., Who Runs For Congress. Ambition, Context and Candidate Emergence (Washington,
D.C.: Congress Quarterly Press, 1994), p. 167.
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consulting services, etc.).22 Not surprisingly, electoral campaigns are candidate-oriented, rather
than party- or presidency-centred, and once in office House and Senate incumbents cannot rely on
the popularity, brand and reputation of their president or party to win re-election. As a
consequence, they develop their distinctive personal ‘home styles’23 and conduct a permanent
campaign geared to generating positive evaluations of their individual behaviour in the hope that
constituents will repay their service with votes at the next election. Although in some
parliamentary systems legislators must also emphasise local representation and personal
connections,24 the American case is unique.  With each incumbent enjoying at least $3 million by
the Congress to run his/her congressional offices, as well as having great fund-raising advantages,
it is no wonder that most sitting legislators receive few serious challenges.  Testimony to the
success of incumbents’ efforts abounds and House members and senators seek and win re-
election with extraordinary success. The mean re-election rate for House incumbents in 2004 was
over 98 percent (96 percent in 2002), and 90 percent in the Senate.  Survey evidence repeatedly
demonstrates the importance that congressional voters attach to an incumbent’s constituency
attentiveness, personal qualities, and experience. So, even though public trust and confidence in
the Congress has often been low,25 constituents’ support for their members of Congress has been
consistently high.26
                                                 
22 Candidates for the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados the Colombian Cámara de Representantes as well as the
legislatures of the Baltic States are in a similar position. See Barry Ames, 'Party Discipline in the Brazilian Chamber of
Deputies' in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., Legislative Politics in Latin America, Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press 2002: 193; Barry Ames, 'Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel:
Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress', Journal of Politics, 57/2, 1995: 324-343; Rachael E. Ingall and Brian F.
Crisp, 'Determinants of Home Style: The Many Incentives for Going Home in Colombia', Legislative Studies
Quarterly, 26/3: 487-512; and Marcus Kreuzer and Vello Pettai, 'Patterns of Political Instability: Affiliation Patterns of
Politicians and Voters in Post-Communist Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania', Studies in Comparative International
Development, 38/2, (Summer 2003): 73-95.
23 Richard F. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown, 1978 and
Richard F. Fenno, The United States Senate. A Bicameral Perspective (Washington, D.C. and London, American
Enterprise Institute, 1982).
24 Giuseppe Di Palma, Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament. Berkeley, CA: The University
of California Press, 1977: 55-63; Raphael Zarinski, 'Intra-Party Conflict in a Dominant Party: The Experience of Italian
Christian Democracy', Journal of Politics, 1/1, 1965: 3-33; Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework
For Analysis. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976: 88-90, 90-99; Masaru Kohno, Japan's
Postwar Party Politics. Princeton, NJ and London: Princeton University Press: 91-115; Gary W. Cox and Frances
Rosenbluth, 'The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan', American Political Science Review, 87/3, 1993:
578-579.
25 The National Election Studies, NES Cumulative Data File dataset.
26 The National Election Studies, NES Cumulative Data File dataset. See also Richard F. Fenno, ‘If, As Ralph Nader
Says, Congress Is “The Broken Branch”, How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?’ in Ornstein, Congress in
Change, pp. 277-287; Glenn R. Parker and Roger H. Davidson, ‘Why Do Americans Love Their Congressmen So
Much More Than Their Congress?’ Legislative Studies Quarterly, 4 (1979), pp. 53-61.
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Congressional Organisation
The personal nature of the lawmakers’ connections with their constituents has direct implications
for the way congressional politicians conduct themselves once elected, and how they organise the
chambers to serve their interests. Just as individual House members and senators are goal oriented
in seeking election and re-election, when they arrive in Washington, they behave in similarly
individualistic ways. They represent their constituencies, formulate public policy, and organise
the House and Senate to reflect their needs. As Collie has observed: ‘When candidates tend to
win on their own outside the legislature, they tend to act on their own inside the legislature.'27
How House members and senators will participate and influence congressional decision-making
processes will be determined by the time, energy, and political capital that they invest as
individuals, their staff assistance as well as the chamber's prevailing formal and informal
contexts, which structure members’ incentives. All legislative bodies are collectivities of
particular representatives who reflect the wishes of particular electoral coalitions. Most
parliaments emphasize collective representation, typically manifested in strong party ties.  Most
MPs win election because they bear a particular party label, not because of their individual
qualities. Once elected they are expected to toe the party line in the belief that their party loyalty
will benefit all party MPs and in many cases lead to promotion within the party hierarchy. In the
US, the framers’ preoccupations with representation and limited (rather than efficient)
government created an inherent tension between representation and lawmaking in Congress.
Members of Congress have been obliged to marry dual and contrasting roles. 28  These roles
reflect the classic distinction between legislators as delegates, who represent the parochial
interests of their constituents, and legislators as trustees, à la Burke, who collectively make laws
for the nation. House members and senators must constantly juggle these competing notions of
representation, decide their own representational calculus, and create congressional structures that
serve these dual roles.  Before exploring the implications of the delegate-trustee duality, let us
first note some essential differences between the House and the Senate, which are central to
understanding the U.S. Congress as a singular institution.
                                                 
27 Melissa P. Collie, ‘Universalism and the Parties in the US House of Representatives, 1921-80,’ American Journal of
Political Science, 32 (1988), pp. 865-83.
28 Roger H. Davidson, ‘Congress As a Representative Institution’. In Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson, and Robert
Gerald Livingston, eds., The US Congress and the German Bundestag. Comparisons of Democratic Processes (Boulder
and Oxford: Westview Press, 1990), p. 49
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Although recent scholarship has significantly reduced the imbalance, our knowledge of the
Congress comes largely from the House. The Senate, however, is unique among legislative
chambers in its organisation, representation, and decision-making.29 The House and Senate differ
in the size of their membership, the length of members’ terms, their constituencies, constitutional
responsibilities, their distinct internal decision-making processes, their informal procedures and
their formal rules. As the larger chamber, the House’s procedural rules are more formalised, less
flexible, more comprehensive, and constrain members far more than those in the Senate. Like
most legislative bodies, the House is primarily a majoritarian institution, and is more hierarchical
and bureaucratic than the Senate. House rules generally ensure that a voting majority  -
specifically, a party majority acting through the Speaker and the majority leadership  - can
effectively control the chamber’s agenda, timetable, and floor proceedings. In contrast, the Senate
has fewer and less restrictive rules, which are flexible by design, and, crucially, intended to
promote and preserve the individual prerogatives of senators and procedural minorities. One
manifestation of these procedural differences is that although the House provides for a motion to
move the previous question by majority vote (to cut off debate), the Senate does not. Thus, a
House majority may require a decisive vote on a pending question, but a Senate majority has no
similar mechanism.  The Senate also boasts a tradition of mutual accommodation, courtesy, and
comity, 30 and is often seen as Burke’s ‘deliberative assembly of one nation’, 31 in contrast to his
‘Congress of ambassadors’, which identifies the House.32
Levels of subject specialisation and expertise in the two chambers also differ. With less than a
quarter of the membership of the House, and the need to cover the same policy ground, senators
must spread their time and energy more thinly across several committees and the floor. In
contrast, committees and subcommittees dominate the House’s work to an extent that would be
alien to the Senate. Senate floor action is at least as important as action taken by Senate
committees. This is partly because Rule XIV allows a senator wishing to propose a bill or
resolution to bypass committees completely and place her bill directly on the Senate Calendar
(which identifies bills and resolutions33 awaiting floor actions) or propose it in the form of an
                                                 
29 See Bruce, I. Oppenheimer, ed. US Senate Exceptionalism. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2001.
30 However, see Eric M. Uslaner, ‘Is the Senate More Civil Than the House’ and Barbara Sinclair, ‘Individualism,
Partisanship, and Cooperation in the Senate’. In Burdett A. Loomis, ed., Esteemed Colleagues: Civility and
Deliberation in the US Senate. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
31 Edmund Burke, ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol’ (1774). Quoted in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of
Representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967, p. 171.
32 Ross K. Baker, House, and Senate. Third edition. New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001, p. 50.
33 In contrast with House and Senate bills, House, Senate, Joint and Concurrent Resolutions do not have the force of
law.
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amendment to a bill already under consideration on the floor. In consequence, the Senate majority
party faces real difficulties in using the chamber’s rules and processes effectively to control the
agenda and, unlike the House with its Speaker; the Senate lacks a powerful presiding officer.
Though hardly powerless, in steering the Senate the majority leader is always vulnerable, in that
any individual senator is entitled to move a motion to debate a particular measure on the chamber
floor.  Moreover, any such motion is subject to a filibuster, unless it is an executive or judicial
nomination or treaty, which is listed for Senate floor consideration on the Executive Calendar.
None the less, the majority leader does have a number of procedural tools, which can be used if
individual senators or factions seek to dominate the floor.34
Regardless of these institutional differences, House members and senators are elected and re-
elected largely because of their own individual efforts, rather than because of the support of the
president, other party leaders, their party organisations, or interest groups. Once elected, they also
act purposively and vigorously to represent their constituents, play a meaningful role in the
making of national policy, and organise the chambers of which they are members to serve these
ends.
In the same way that congressional candidates create their own personal organisations to win
office, once they are members of the House and Senate, they construct their own personal
enterprises to pursue their individual legislative and policy interests. Notwithstanding variations
in their complexity, structure and function, 35 the personal offices of House members and senators
are significant drivers of congressional activity. The 100 senators, 435 representatives, four
delegates (from the territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, plus District of
Columbia), and one resident commissioner (from Puerto Rico)36 spend more than $3.9 billion
from annual appropriations (2004) to run the Congress, or about $7.2 million a year for every
member – quadruple the amount appropriated in 1977.  About 10,000 congressional staffers are
employed by members in their personal offices, outside the control of party or committee leaders.
Excluding interns, House members may employ no more than 18 permanent staffers, split
between Capitol Hill and district offices, although four additional individuals may be employed if
part-time, temporary, or partly employed by another House committee or other unit.  Senate
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enterprises may include as many as 100 staffers, depending on the population of the state. In
addition, House members may each spend up to $1.6m. per annum for travel, office, staff, and
communications, with senators allowed between $2.2 and $3.8 million (FY2004).37  Unlike
presidential candidates, however, congressional candidates for office are not eligible to receive
public funding for their election campaigns. These resources are the envy of legislators
elsewhere.
Although significant proportions of Congress members’ resources are used to provide constituent
services from district and state offices, a lot remains for legislative work and other Washington
activities. For individual legislators, particularly junior members, the magnitude and control of
these resources underline the importance that the Congress attaches to representation and
maximizing the discretion of lawmakers in fulfilling their congressional responsibilities. For
Congress as a whole, strong individual enterprises flatten the internal distribution of power while
enhancing the capacity of both chambers to assert their will broadly and independently in national
policymaking.
Members of the Congress are responsible for making laws, as well as representing the people.
Although representation and lawmaking cannot in practice be separated from one another,
members of Congress certainly find it easier to represent than to make laws. Thus, in comparative
perspective, the Congress is less efficient as a lawmaker – and deliberately so - than legislatures
within parliamentary systems.  The Congress’ inefficiencies lie in the framers’ insistence on
diffused responsibility, mixed representation, and institutional competition.
Tsebelis makes the point that the configuration of institutions in different political systems places
veto players (with special powers, especially agenda-setting) in policymaking sequences. 38 The
legislative process in the Congress includes more institutional veto points than any other. First,
the responsibilities for collecting policy-related information and processing legislation are
dispersed among numerous units; inevitably, the legislative process becomes highly fragmented.
Broad policy areas such as the budget, energy, health care, homeland security and international
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trade are subdivided and parcelled out to various standing committees (and subcommittees) with
real decision-making powers. When spending is involved, the process is even more complex.
Programmes must first be authorised (by House and Senate subject committees), appropriations
made (by the appropriations committees), revenues raised or borrowed (by the revenues
committees), and revenue reconciled with spending in a complete budget (by the budget
committees). Overlapping and dispersed committee responsibilities, often encouraged and
reinforced by interest group activities and legislators themselves, frequently generate inter-
committee jurisdictional disputes and impede the formulation of coherent and/or comprehensive
legislation.39
Second, the legislative process in Congress is deliberately cumbersome.  The process includes:
(1) bill introduction; (2) referral to committee(s) and subcommittee(s); (3) requests for reports
from executive agencies; (4) hearings; (5) mark-ups (bill-writing); (6) reports to the House or
Senate; (7) requests for a special procedural rule in the House -- which determines whether a bill
(or resolution) will be considered, for how long, and under what conditions it will be debated
(including the sections to be debated, those to be voted on and when,  and those to be protected
from points of order, and so forth) – and, therefore, how the majority controls the floor agenda)40
or consideration in the Senate from the majority leader; (8) floor debate in both chambers,
typically preceded by an important vote in the House on a special rule, which the majority party
must win; (9) a House-Senate conference committee to resolve House-Senate differences; and
(10) the presidential signature or veto, which if denied requires even more steps.  This is a breath-
taking set of serial requirements to pass a single measure.
Third, the legislative process is cumulative and sequential. At any point, a measure may not be
considered, delayed, amended (sometimes beyond recognition), ignored, or defeated.  Thus,
strategically positioned party leaders, committees, interest groups, and individual members of
Congress can obstruct the process – and, by doing so, kill a measure.  There are fifty or so veto
points along the way, and double this number if expenditures are involved. For a measure to
proceed through all stages of what amounts to a formidable legislative obstacle course, its
supporters must assemble a succession of chamber majorities at each step or veto point.41
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Between 1947 and 2004, each two-year Congress witnessed the introduction of about 10,000 to
12,000 bills and resolutions. Almost all were referred to a committee (or several), usually within
twenty-four hours of their introduction, but only between 14-35 percent were reported out of
committee, and only between 5-7 percent became law. The chances of a legislative measure
falling are far greater than those for it succeeding.42
Fourth, the Congress’ decentralised character, its weak party organisation and the nature of the
electoral connection make legislative bargaining and compromise essential.  At each decision
point, votes and favours must be traded, arms twisted, and concessions made in order to construct
winning coalitions. Fifth, the congressional legislative process works in a two-year cycle. Failure
to complete action on any measure before Congress adjourns sine die means that it dies
automatically.
Overall, the congressional processes for agenda setting, considering policy options and making
decisions are influenced greatly by a mass of complex chamber rules and procedures. In contrast
to the British House of Commons, substitute amendments are permitted in the Committee of the
Whole (i.e. a commonly used floor procedure involving the entire House meeting in the form of a
committee, which allows more expeditious action) or in standing committees. Thus, four
amendments may be pending at any time (in contrast to two in the Commons): a first-degree
amendment, which may be subject to a second-degree perfecting amendment and a substitute
amendment, which in turn may be subject to a further second-degree amendment. Majority party
leaders can use an array of procedural devices to advance or protect their party’s interests. Under
current arrangements, House leaders may bundle diverse legislative measures into omnibus
packages, use other ‘unorthodox’ techniques, and manipulate the rules to push through
controversial legislation that is important to the majority party.43 In the Senate, the legislative
process is very different and even more difficult (increasingly so in recent decades), since
senators have exploited their individual prerogatives through the increased use of filibusters, floor
amendments, and informal “holds” on given bills.44
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Finally, despite Congress’ constitutional autonomy and empowerment to pass laws, the system of
separated institutions requires members to take seriously their responsibility for consulting with
other parts of the government, including the president, hundreds of executive agencies, state and
local governments, and the law as interpreted by the courts. Such consultation further increases
the chances of legislative delay.
Historically, legislatures have delegated to parties and committees the important tasks of agenda
setting, examining and processing legislation, building majority coalitions and shaping collective
outcomes. The U.S. Congress is unique in the substantial resources and important roles accorded
to congressional committees. Like all democratic legislatures, the Congress has always had some
sort of committee system,45 which has served the collective needs of the institution as well as the
personal political interests of individual members. Committees have also played prominent roles
in famous congressional investigations: the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Vietnam
hearings, the Senate’s Watergate committee hearings, the House Energy and Commerce
Committee’s tobacco hearings, as well as the Army ‘red-baiting’ hearings of the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations led by Senator Joseph McCarthy.
For the legislature as a whole, committees encourage specialisation and a division of labour,
which enable both congressional chambers to process large volumes and wide varieties of
legislative proposals simultaneously, in part by acquiring and disseminating valuable political and
policy information.  In an institution replete with veto points, moreover, committees provide
arenas where small numbers of members can arrive at the compromises and bargains necessary to
carry proposals into legislation. Woodrow Wilson’s declaration that ‘Congress in its committee
rooms is Congress at work’46 is as true today as it was more than one hundred and twenty years
ago. In any two-year congress, almost nine out of ten bills die in committee, never making the
journey to the House and Senate floors.47  Committees provide individual Congress members
with opportunities to specialise and thus to serve their constituencies, exercise influence and
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make good public policy.48
When legislatures delegate power to committees (and parties), they run the risk that these sub-
groups will make decisions on their behalf that do not accurately reflect the collective preferences
of the chamber. Legislative scholars have focused on the nature of the relationship between
committees and the entire chamber (floor) and between committees and the parties, especially the
majority party. In the British House of Commons, for example, committees do not present many
legislative hurdles for leaders.49 This is not the case in the Congress and other legislatures with
significant veto points.50  Moreover, the committee-party relationship has changed over time and
has been the subject of fruitful theoretical debates in recent congressional studies.
Distributive theorists argue that legislators with particular constituency or policy interests seek
assignment to committees that are unresponsive to the chamber majority. In committee members
become socialised into certain norms and receive selective committee-based information. In
consequence, committees make decisions reflecting particularistic preferences rather than the
general policy preferences of the parent chamber as a whole. For the legislature to take collective
action through majority action on those issues that interest them most, members must make
concessions on issues of lesser interest to them. On this reading, committees are agencies for
interests outside the legislature.51
In contrast, informational theorists view committees as reflecting the distribution of preferences
across the chamber as a whole. Committees, then, provide vital expert information to risk-averse
committee non-members, who wish to reduce uncertainty over the effects of their floor voting
decisions.52 Finally, partisan - or party government - theorists, argue that committees are
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essentially agents of the majority legislative party, rather than the chamber as a whole. Majority
party leaders effectively structure committee memberships to promote the majority party’s
collective agenda and simultaneously seek to satisfy the disparate policy and constituency
interests of majority party members. 53
These models – distributional, informational, and partisan -- stake out the theoretical possibilities
for committee-party relations in the Congress. In practice, however, given the dynamic context of
legislative politics in Washington, as agents committee members must simultaneously satisfy a
variety of different principals, including clientele groups outside Congress, the parent chamber, as
well as party leaders and party colleagues. The extent to which they seek to do this will varies
from issue to issue and over time and this in turn has important implications for comparisons with
other legislatures.
The Textbook Congress and ‘Committee Government’
In comparative legislative studies, the dominant interpretation of the US Congress remains the
powerful, if outdated, view of the so-called ‘textbook’ Congress of the middle decades of the
twentieth century.54 Its key components are highly decentralised decision-making structures, with
weak parties and strong committees. As noted, nothing in the US Constitution, American political
culture, or the style of American politics preordained this organisational configuration.55
The background to the textbook Congress lies in the late nineteenth century, when the American
party system stabilised around clearly defined constituency bases and produced large numbers of
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safe seats for each party.56 Under these conditions, congressional party government developed
with the Republicans as the dominant party. Particularly in the House, central party leaders could
determine whether a public bill would be considered out of order on the Calendar, exercise tight
control over committees, ensure strong discipline on the floor, and impose party discipline by
extending or withholding desirable committee assignments. With the House’s adoption of the
Reed Rules (named after Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed) between 1880 and 1894, the majority
party could control the timing and content of key floor bills, prevent the minority from
obstructing the majority by reducing the number for a quorum, limit dilatory motions, require that
all public bills be referred to standing committees, require Rules Committee (chaired by the
Speaker) approval of committee bills before floor consideration, and control floor amendments.57
In other words, circa 1900 the House majority party dominated the legislative agenda and process
in a manner roughly similar to party-dominated parliaments. Through these institutional
mechanisms, the Speaker could directly affect the political careers of individual House members,
enhance legislative predictability, encourage greater policy coherence on the part of the majority
party, command cohesive majorities on important legislation, ensure that the majority party’s
agenda was considered and enacted, and in these ways promote the party’s brand and reputation
with the electorate. 58
In the Senate, the combination of the chamber’s limited and often-ignored rules and the
prerogatives accorded individual senators did not conduce towards party government.  Still, after
the mid-1880s, the chair of the majority caucus began acting as majority leader - the nearest
equivalent to the House Speaker – and used the committee system, control over committee
assignments, and the Republican Steering Committee to engender majority party control over the
Senate’s agenda and cohesive party voting.59
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Ironically, the appeal of party rule as an operating principle of American government declined in
the early 1900s as Progressive insurgents became increasingly frustrated with the inability of the
Republican leaders to respond to the nation’s emerging industrial, urban political agenda. In this
context, individual members, with their legislative career ambitions, grew restive. In the House, a
revolt inspired by Progressive Republicans and Democrats sharply reduced the power of Speaker
Joseph G. Cannon (1903-1911) by removing him from the Rules Committee and increasing that
committee’s membership. Following the 1910 elections, the new Democratic majority removed
the Speaker’s primacy in making committee assignments. The effect was to set in motion a
process that led to a much more decentralised form of party government – often called committee
government - which reached its apotheosis in the middle decades of the twentieth century, with
Democrats in the majority.60
Party influence in the Senate also waned as Progressive insurgents took advantage of the
chamber’s tradition of unlimited debate and amendments. The introduction of the direct election
of senators after 1913, which the Progressives initiated, meant that majority party rule, never as
strong in the Senate, was further weakened. As a consequence, Senate committees also acquired
greater autonomy, and majorities of committee members were permitted to call committee caucus
meetings, elect subcommittees, and appoint conferees with the House.61 Except for an interval
during the early New Deal congresses, when majority Democratic leadership acquired
considerable power and influence working in tandem with the Democratic-controlled White
House,62 highly decentralised decision-making became the norm, as southern Democrats
dominated committee chair positions and combined with Republicans in an emerging
“conservative coalition to undermine and thwart the Second New Deal in the mid-to-late 1930s.63
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Within this textbook Congress format, which characterised legislative politics from the late 1940s
until the mid-1960s, and the House more than the Senate, power within the dominant Democratic
Party was decentralised. Although the number of standing committees was reduced in 1946,
individual committees won formal jurisdiction over reasonably specific subject matter, seniority
became entrenched (especially in appointing committee chairs) and committee property rights
were vigorously protected.  As committee membership became increasingly stable, committees
developed their own norms and orientations.  Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s, legislative
resources grew steadily. Especially in the House, legislators’ committee assignments came to
define and determine their careers and reputations. During this period, real power in the House
did not rest with the chamber as a whole or with the majority party, which was divided on many
issues. Rather, it was concentrated in the full standing committees and their markedly
conservative, southern chairs. Party leaders, such as Speaker Sam Rayburn (1940-1946, 1949-
1952, 1955-1961) were not powerless in the textbook Congress, but they were obliged to bargain
with powerful committee chairs.64 The Rules Committee, which had previously been under the
control of the Speaker, was dominated by conservatives and on occasions blocked liberal bills
supported by the majority party leadership,65 while actively promoting conservative priorities.66
Committee power during this period was based on gatekeeping (the ability to determine which
legislative measures would proceed to the floor), informational advantage (the capacity to apply
their cumulative policy expertise to legislation), and proposal power (the power to develop and
shape congressional policy). Underpinning these foundations were powerful norms of deference
and reciprocity, which dictated that non-members of the reporting committee respected
committee decisions, with the expectation of reciprocal respect for their own committees’
decisions.  Cementing committee power was the ex post veto, which gave reporting committee
members a second chance, as members of a House-Senate conference committee, to use their
power at the penultimate stage of the legislative process to negotiate the final contents of the bill.
The conference committee could effectively present both chambers with a fait accompli, which
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both would be reluctant to reject.67 Committee power, then, had both negative and positive
components.68 The negative or gatekeeping power involved the ability to restrict the choices
available to colleagues in the parent chamber, to kill legislation, if necessary, by refusing to report
it to the floor, and to use the ex post veto. Negative power was inextricably tied to the sequential
and iterative character of the legislative process. For a measure to win House and Senate
approval, it needed the recommendation of at least one committee. The positive aspects of
committee power included their ability to propose policy prescriptions, to circumvent the floor,
and ultimately, with the help of party leaders, to persuade a majority of committee non-members
to vote in favour of a committee’s recommendations.
Negative committee power was particularly important in the House, in that a stringent
germaneness rule, which prohibits amending a bill or resolution to include a   different subject,
made it difficult for committee non-members to circumvent a committee by offering floor
amendments. It was often reinforced by ‘amendment trees’that limited the number and type of
amendments that may be pending at any one time, although a special rule or unanimous consent
agreement can allow for the consideration of a specified bill or resolution.
Floor managers of committee bills - usually the full committee or subcommittee chair - were
recognised to speak and offer defensive amendments on behalf of the committee before any other
members were recognised or their amendments considered.  Bill managers were also recognised
before other members to offer second-degree amendments designed to counter or dilute hostile
amendments and/or consolidate support for a bill.69  Floor consideration of bills title-by-title and
section-by-section, House special rules, and Senate unanimous consent requests also effectively
precluded certain types of hostile amendments. Even if a bill’s managers did not actually use
negative committee power to the fullest, its threatened use often allowed committees additional
leverage with which to bargain for support. Positive committee power was weaker, but far from
insignificant. Committees were expected to propose and report legislative measures to the floors.
They enjoyed wide discretion to write the contents of bills, and on the floor they could exploit
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their recognition privileges to change proposals (by accepting amendments, for example) that
took account of shifting majorities.
Of course, positive committee power did not mean that all proposals were accepted on the floor.
Majority party leaders could refuse to schedule a measure, floor majorities could refuse to
consider a measure and committee recommendations could be overturned in the other chamber or
in a conference committee. Indeed, recent scholarship has criticized committee government as a
description of the textbook Congress and placed greater emphasis instead on the persistence of
party government over the course of congressional history.
To explain this recent scholarship, we need to revisit the theoretical models set out in the previous
section. Informational theorists are generally sceptical of the existence of ‘party’ as a
phenomenon in the legislature and, from their perspective, the idea of a transition from party to
committee government or vice versa make no sense. The dominant view among partisan theorists,
expressed by Brady and Cooper, Rohde and Sinclair, depicts a transition from party to committee
government and back to party government.70  But Cox and McCubbins argue that committee
government was de facto decentralised party government, because throughout this period the
congressional majority party was able to maintain firm control over the floor agenda. Only rarely
did a majority party fail to obtain its goals in setting the agenda, and only rarely did it fail to
prevent an unfavoured bill from reaching the floor or in getting it voted out of the chamber. The
Cox-McCubbins argument runs that the powers enjoyed by the majority party were then, and are
now, unconditional. In contrast to conditional party government theory, the majority party’s
power does not depend on the preference homogeneity of its members. So, when applied to the
textbook Congress period, and notwithstanding the conservative coalition’s well-documented
existence, in both houses the majority party was the dominant actor. It elected or selected all
institutional leaders, including committee and subcommittee chairs, made assignments of its own
members to standing, select, and conference committees, established the legislative timetable,
wrote the chamber’s rules and procedures and guaranteed its policy priorities over those of the
minority party.71  The majority party also held a supermajority on the Rules Committee, and
controlled a disproportionate share of staff and other legislative resources.
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Cox and McCubbins’ analysis of House floor votes on final passage shows that between 1937-1973
the majority party was defeated less than three per cent of the time, with defeats exceeding seven
per cent in only one congress. Given the strength of southern conservatives in the majority
Democratic party during this period, a coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans
surprisingly did not oppose majority Democrats on 92 per cent of these final votes. No southern
Democratic/conservative coalition chair ever forced a conservative coalition bill out of his
committee and on to the House floor.72 Moreover, between 1937-1960 – the heyday of the
conservative coalition - the conservative-dominated Rules Committee rarely took action to defeat a
(majority party) rule73 and rarely defeated majority party resolutions relating to committee
investigations. Such investigations included those conducted by the House Un-American Activities
Committee, which liberals often wished to restrict and conservatives typically wanted to expand.
The committee did, however, use its gatekeeping powers effectively to obstruct and weaken the
majority party’s agenda by providing stronger than previous (or subsequent) support for minority-
party positions and by keeping some bills from being considered. 74
Perhaps surprisingly, similar results may be demonstrated for the Senate. Between 1937-1973,
and excluding votes requiring 2/3 or 3/5 supermajorities, the majority party was defeated on just
over three per cent of final passage and executive and judicial nomination votes (see earlier),
compared with the minority party, which was defeated on 22 per cent of votes. In eleven of the
eighteen Senates during this period, the majority experienced no defeats whatsoever.75 These data
suggest strongly that even without the majoritarian rules and tools available to the House majority
leadership, majority leaders in the nonmajoritarian Senate could control their chamber’s agenda
during the textbook period. However, their capacity to do so was made even more difficult when
the minority party also controlled the presidency.
Based on this and other evidence, and allowing for important House-Senate differences, the
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majority party in the Congress at that time, as in most parliamentary systems, appeared able to
retain formal control over the floor agenda and, therefore, influence to a certain extent and in
varying degrees the electoral appeal of its party brand.  The era of committee government might
then more appropriately be regarded as a period of decentralised party government.  In any event,
the combination of influence, discretion and autonomy enjoyed by congressional committees and
their chairs was not only much greater than that experienced in parliamentary committees in
Europe and elsewhere but also greater than in the Congress today. Regardless of how it is
labelled, the form of legislative organisation equated with the ‘textbook Congress’, and accepted
still by many comparative legislative scholars, does not accurately represent the late twentieth and
early twenty-first century Congress. Of that, there is no question.
The Contemporary Congress and American-Style Party Government
The US Congress today has become much more party-oriented and party-structured.  The history
is familiar. Committee (or decentralised party) government did not mesh well with either
democratic accountability or the Congress’ responsibilities to represent and make laws. More
than any other single event, the 1965 Voting Rights Act and its effective implementation, shifted
the ideological and regional balance of power within the majority Democratic Party, which in
turn wrought reform to the Congress’ internal organisation.
As a consequence of the franchise enlargement and, subsequently, the divergent electoral
responses to the policies of the Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, as well as
partisan gerrymandering,76 predominantly conservative southern Democrat districts become
increasingly Republican. At the same time, Democrats won centrist and more liberal Republican
seats in the northeast. As a consequence, the electoral parties became increasingly homogeneous,
ideologically and geographically, and their electoral bases grew more polarised. The twin trends
of electoral partisanship and polarisation produced two major effects on congressional
organisation.
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First, as the respective parties’ electoral constituencies became more homogeneous and polarised,
so did the congressional parties.  In the late 1970s a majority of House Republicans opposed a
majority of House Democrats on two out of every five floor votes, but by the early 1990s almost
two-thirds were party votes. A similar development occurred in the Senate, where the percentage
of party votes increased from just above 40 to 60 per cent over the same period. As the number of
party votes increased, so did the frequency with which House members and senators of the same
party voted together (party unity) on these votes – rising for both congressional parties from
about 75 per cent between the 1960s and the early 1980s to consistently more than 85 per cent in
the 1990s (and sometimes above 90 per cent).77 Inevitably, as the congressional parties became
more homogeneous and polarized, the number of the southern Democrats and northeastern
Republicans of the textbook era declined.78 Indeed, such was the increase in Republican cohesion
in the new century (almost 93 per cent for House and Senate Republicans combined) that CQ
Weekly identified 2003 as the most partisan year in the Congress since the publication began in
1945.79 In the 108th Congress (2003-04), Republican party discipline was so strong on party unity
votes that no House or Senate Republican voted with his/her party less than 65 per cent of the
time, and only seven House and six Senate Republicans voted with their party on fewer than 80
per cent of party votes.80 As congressional party unity strengthened, partisan policy preferences
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polarized: between the 90th and 107th Houses (1968-2002), the gap between the two parties’ mean
DW-NOMINATE scores - which seek to locate party members’ policy preferences along a single
left-right policy dimension - grew by a remarkable 71 percent in the House and by 56 percent in
the Senate.81  Party strength in the Congress has consistently edged closer to that in western
European parliaments since 1980, albeit without the tight control parliamentary parties enjoy over
those who bear the party label in elections.82
Second, in the aftermath of the Watergate crisis in the early 1970s, the Democratic Party
implemented the most comprehensive reform of the House’s internal distribution of power since
Speaker Cannon’s fall in 1910.  The Democratic caucus made the committees and their chairs
much more accountable to the party rank-and-file.  In addition, seniority would no longer be the
sole criterion for selecting committee chairs whilst limits were placed on the number of
committee assignments and subcommittee chairs that members could hold.83  Perhaps most
importantly, the powers of the House Speaker were strengthened to ensure that floor agendas,
committee agendas, and floor decisions better reflected majority party priorities and that
legislative proceedings generally favoured the majority party. In the Senate, the powers of the
Majority Leader were strengthened somewhat.  After the Republicans won control of both
chambers in the 1994 congressional elections, these trends grew even stronger.
By the 1990s the congressional parties had become the most significant organizational structures
on Capitol Hill84 and the days of the textbook Congress were long gone.  As they became more
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cohesive and more polarized, the congressional parties strengthened the hands of their central
leaders, especially in the House. When their party formed the majority, rank and file members
came to depend on their central party leaders to set and promote a chamber agenda that reflected
the majority party’s positions and priorities and promoted the party’s collective reputation.85 As a
consequence, the power and prestige of recent Speakers – notably Republicans Newt Gingrich
and Dennis Hastert - has approached, perhaps even surpassed, that of their predecessors Reed and
Cannon (also Republicans) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.86
Following their party’s takeover of the House in 1994, the newly elected Speaker Gingrich and
his party colleagues sought to use their electoral document, the Contract With America, as a party
manifesto to set the agenda for the 104th Congress. Echoing Cannon’s party government strategies
in an earlier period, Gingrich attacked committee autonomy by creating a powerful party steering
committee, which he chaired and which possessed supreme agenda setting powers. He established
majority legislative priorities, scheduled items for House and Conference consideration, and
strongly influenced the nomination of majority-party committee members and chairs. As Speaker,
Gingrich personally selected committee chairs who, in a number of cases, were not the most
senior members of their committees but those judged to be more assertive, dynamic, and loyal to
the party’s agenda. Chairs of the ten Appropriations subcommittees were required to pledge
loyalty to the majority party’s legislative agenda, on pain of removal, the terms of committee
chairs were limited, the number of committees cut and committee staffs reduced by almost one-
third.
Under Gingrich’s successor, party government has been further reinforced. Speaker Hastert and
the House Republican Steering Committee now interview and subsequently appoint all committee
and Appropriations subcommittee chairs on the basis of previous loyalty and service to the party
(including fund raising), rather than by seniority. This means in practice that committee chairs go
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to those with a proven track record of party loyalty, whilst the leadership is afforded opportunities
to veto applicants in each new Congress.  The clear losers have been party centrists, who have not
received the committee chairs that strict seniority would have accorded them.
In the present congressional era of a Republican majority, the influence of the leadership over
House floor proceedings increasingly resembles that found in many parliamentary regimes, and
their actions are legitimised by reference to the party’s continuing majorities at the polls.
Following the 1994 elections, Gingrich removed various procedural protections afforded
committees. This was to permit the majority leadership to intervene more easily at the post-
committee or floor legislative stage to mould legislation more closely to the priorities of the
Republican Conference (caucus). 87 Committees have also been more frequently bypassed and
major bills lumped together in omnibus packages, which are rammed through the chamber at the
end of the year with the full panoply of disciplinary weapons 88 At the floor stage, moreover, the
majority leadership have resorted more and more to restrictive special rules and self-executing
amendments to structure floor debate on legislation seen as important to the party, and ultimately
determine the chamber’s legislative product, in the process limiting the ability of members
(including majority party members) to introduce and vote on amendments.89 By the end of 2005,
only one in every five special rules (N = 69) did not restrict the offering of floor amendments
during initial floor consideration in the 109th House, compared with almost three in five in the
104th House (1995-96).90 As a consequence, the number of floor amendments offered to major
legislation has declined. Moreover, if committee chairs stray too far from the party’s median
position and report bills that do not reflect caucus opinion, the Speaker requires the bill to be
rewritten before sending it to the floor.  In violation of House rules and in the context of a small
majority for the majority, on a series of very close floor votes on legislation important to
congressional Republicans and the Bush Administration, Hastert and Majority Leader Tom
DeLay (second-ranking in the majority leadership hierarchy) have held open voting (which by
custom since 1995 has been limited to 17 minutes) for as long as three hours while recalcitrant
members have been pressured to toe the party line. Minority members have also been excluded
from conference committees with the Senate, and the Speaker has presided over debates on
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conference reports, even though he has sponsored a bill himself.91
Underpinning contemporary party government in the House is an expressly partisan ‘majority of
the majority’ strategy.92 That is, the majority leadership is only willing to seek House approval of
legislation that they or the Bush administration regard as crucial to the Republicans’ national
reputation if a majority of majority Republicans support it. It is not happy to seek House approval
of such legislation if only a (bipartisan) chamber majority – rather than a majority of Republicans
– support it. This stratagem is part of a broader majority party strategy, which is to push through
the House by the narrowest of voting margins the strongest measures possible that can attract the
support of Republican conservatives.93 The clear objective is to maximise the House majority’s
advantage in negotiations with the Senate, where centrists exert greater influence.94 Implementing
this partisan ‘majority of the majority’ strategy typically necessitates, first, excluding minority
Democrats (who are almost equally cohesive in their efforts to thwart the majority party) from
intra-House negotiations and, second, placing enormous pressure on recalcitrant House
Republicans – who may well face potent counter pressures from constituency interests – to vote
with the party line. These party pressures on the reluctant members  are then reinforced by
promises, usually realised, that they will receive extraordinary financial and other assistance from
the national party in the next and subsequent elections.  As part of the Republican team building,
such funds are increasingly provided by legislators in noncompetitive seats, who are “taxed” by
the party leadership to donate generously in support of their more endangered colleagues.
Increasing partisan homogenisation and polarisation has strengthened party activity and
leadership in the Senate too, albeit with some familiar limitations. Following House approval of
much of the Republicans’ Contract With America in 1995, conservative Republicans supported
various attempts by their majority leaders, Trent Lott and Bill Frist, to instil greater party
accountability and responsibility. Several failed attempts have been made, for example, to
discipline errant centrist committee chairs, most notably the centrist Appropriations Committee
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chair for not supporting the balanced budget constitutional amendment in 1995, and the centrist
chair of the Judiciary Committee over President Bush’s judicial nominations in 2004.   Although
these efforts failed, in 2004 the Republican Conference allowed Frist to fill half the Republican
vacancies on the most desirable standing committees without regard to seniority (which would
favour party centrists), and limited Republican senators’ assignments on less desirable
committees. (Senate Democrats already give complete committee assignment power to their
leader.)
On key legislation, moreover, Senate majority leaders of both parties have attempted to instil
greater party accountability and responsibility by exploiting their agenda setting powers,
expediting the legislative process by bypassing committees, negotiating and orchestrating post-
committee deals on the floor or in conference, or even by initiating a filibuster to advantage the
majority party’s position.95 Still, all such attempts remain subject to the unanimous consent of all
senators, the essential nonmajoritarian character and individualistic culture of the Senate – all of
which present real limits to party government in the chamber. The Senate party majority (or its
majority party leader) simply cannot control the chamber’s agenda – positively or negatively – to
the extent that a House party majority or Speaker can. Underlining any action by the majority
leader in the contemporary Senate is the increased threat of extended debate and pervasive
obstructionism – by individual senators or by the minority party acting in concert, and especially
if the legislation or nomination is important to the majority party.96 Under current Senate rules,
any individual senator may hold the floor indefinitely on any debatable motion unless or until 60
senators invoke Rule XXII (the cloture rule) and vote to shut off extended debate. But, in the
current party-oriented context, even extended debate may fall before the threat of a determined
Republican majority to use its procedural power to restrict – or abolish – filibusters on some
judicial nominations.
The Congress: The Exceptional Legislature?
Our review of the US Congress as “exceptional” has identified a fundamental combination of its
formal institutional features that are unique among world legislatures. These fundamental features
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stem from the separated system created in 1787 and the Constitution’s insistence on competition
among the different institutions of the government. The Congress’ unique set of features includes
legislative autonomy from the executive; a simple plurality voting system, which effectively
discriminates against third parties and coalition governments; strong bicameralism with single-
member districts in the House and equal representation for all 50 states in the Senate, regardless
of population; and exceedingly lax procedural rules in the Senate, with a corresponding  reliance
on informal agreements among all senators. At various times and in different eras, these
institutional features may produce some close similarities with some parliamentary regimes, but
sometimes they will not. America’s is not a parliamentary system and never will be.  As Dahl
observes, ‘among the [22] countries most comparable to the United States and where democratic
institutions have long existed without breakdown, not one has adopted our American
constitutional system’.97  The US system is an exceptional one, and the institutional Congress
contributes a great deal to this exceptionalism.
Specifically, in this article we have emphasised the ubiquity of veto points within America’s
separated system and within the Congress in particular. But, beyond the formal institutional
structures, the specifics of congressional politics flow from the exceptionalism of American
society and political culture, which emphasises individualism and assertiveness, republicanism
and constitutionalism, establishing rules, equality of opportunity, participation, cultural and
geographic diversity, and decentralisation. Thus, even as partisanship and partisan polarisation
have grown stronger in the contemporary period, local representation and its corollary,
parochialism, continue to dominate congressional electoral politics. The highly personalised
connections forged between lawmakers and their constituents remain, and are continually
reinfoirced by their enterprises in House and Senate office buildings on Capitol Hill. These potent
decentralising forces also act as a constraint on stronger parties and party accountability.
At the same time, both in the daily conduct of congressional politics and in the research findings,
there are significant similarities with other legislative regimes, including those within different
types of parliamentary systems. Indeed,  the dynamism of the Congress as a political institution
has dictated that its internal arrangements and relations with other institutions within America’s
separated system have fluctuated over time. In particular, the Congress has not always been the
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autonomous centre of government that the Constitution’s framers sought or the assertive
institution that at times it became.  For almost every period of assertiveness, we can find one
characterised by acquiescence and subordination to the president. Because America has a
separated system, we see the fluctuations in congressional-presidential relations as substantially
greater than in parliamentary systems.  For the same reasons, we have eschewed examining the
Congress exclusively through the lens of the committee-based textbook institution commonly
portrayed in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Notwithstanding Madison’s warning of
the ‘mischiefs of faction’ in Federalist No. 10, considerable empirical evidence confirms his
subsequent observation that ‘in every political society, parties are unavoidable.’98  Indeed,
congressional parties are currently alive and well, and in the early twenty-first century they
constitute the most important political organisations on Capitol Hill. These scholarly findings, as
well as the day-to-day reporting of the contemporary legislative process,  serve to undermine the
claim for the Congress’ absolute singularity.
Still, various forces, both on Capitol Hill and within the Unites States as a whole, have
systematically strengthened American legislative parties since the mid-1970s.  House seats have
grown less competitive, because of sectional realignments (e.g., Republican dominance in the
conservative South), the growing value of incumbency, and the active redrawing of districts to
benefit incumbents.  Within the Congress, the power of seniority, which slowly, but
automatically, promoted members on individual committees, has waned, replaced in large part by
substantial increases in the power of party leaders.  Especially in the House, leaders’ strength
derives from their ability to convince the party backbenchers that they are better off collectively if
they stick closely together and delegate to their leaders legislative responsibility for formulating
legislation important to the party’s brand.  This grant of power remains contingent, however;
leaders can be – and have been – replaced, even the most powerful ones, like Speaker Gingrich
and Majority Leader DeLay.  Still, the ideological homogeneity of both parties and the calculated,
collective delegation of power by the House Republican Conference and Democratic Caucus
reflect an institutional arrangement that has moved the American Congress, and particularly the
House of Representatives, more toward a parliamentary model.
But this analogy can be pressed only so far, in that legislative party leaders have found it
essential to engage in extensive bartering for votes on very divisive issues and have relied heavily
since 2003 on presidential assistance to move forward a partisan agenda.  The powerful
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“centrifugal” forces of diverse congressional districts, complex issues, and the fear of electoral
retribution remain strong, and the long-term success of legislative leaders must take them into
account.  So, ‘qualified exceptionalism’ seems the most appropriate description for the American
Congress.  It may well be “exceptional,” but it is less than unique as it responds to many of the
same forces, in some of the same ways (e.g., strong parties) as many other representative
assemblies around the world.
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